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Abstract 
In this letter, we review some research efforts in the area of Pairing based encryption for data transmission and 
storage taking note of the computational overhead and consequently present a simple encryption scheme to 
buttress our initiative further. 
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1. Main text  
Wireless sensor network is the congregation of small lightweight nodes that communicate through radio links to 
exchange information about the physical environment they measure. They are made up of a computational 
device in this case a microcontroller, an n-bit memory and an antenna for transmission of sensory data. Sensors 
networks are applied in the industry for process monitoring and also in military applications. They are usually 
deployed in an unsecured manner where they are predisposed to attacks. One of the ways sensors can be 
attacked is through masquerading where an obnoxious entity pretends to be a legitimate node in a 
communication network. Such a node can drop data packets instead of forwarding it to the proper destination. 
Also spoofing attacks are common in sensor networks were confidential data are listened to by an illegitimate 
node who wants to extract some information from the communication channel. To ensure data integrity and 
authentication cryptographic primitives are employed. Sensor nodes have limit to their computational abilities 
because of their energy constrained properties. Cryptographic methods employed should ensure that 
performance objectives are met in terms of overhead. Cryptography have two broad classes Public Key 
cryptography and Symmetric Key cryptography employ secret key pairs; public key and secret key. It also 
employs Public Key infrastructure were a Certificate Authority authenticates the public keys stored in its 
database.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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The Certificate Authority signs the public key using digital signature. Public Key cryptography provides the 
following service authentication and non-repudiation. This is because a separate entity verifies the ownership of 
the public keys belonging to individual nodes so it is  impossible  to  deny that it is the  originator  of  the  data  
packets  or  it  is  the legitimate node on the other end of the communication channel. Also key distribution is 
enhanced. The key storage with Public key infrastructure pose significant overhead costs and cannot be 
employed in sensor networks. Also the length of secret keys generated due to large primes can lead to high 
computational costs. Cryptographic primitive employed in sensor networks should consider the constraints on 
resources especially eliminating the overhead requirements posed by a public key infrastructure thereby 
reducing power consumption. Identity-based cryptography meets these requirements. IBC was first proposed by 
Shamir [1] in his paper in 1984 and stated that secret key pairs can be generated from the identities of the 
computing entities. The private key generator generates the private key while the public keys are generated 
from the identities of two communicating nodes. There is no need for   a Public Key infrastructure to store the 
publicly known keys or for distribution.  
2. Problem Statement 
   and    are  prime  subgroups  of  elliptic  curve     is  a  subgroup  of  characteristic  2  or  3  finite field 
that is     . There are three types of pairing [2] Type 1 pairing;    =   , Type 2  pairing              and  there 
exists φ  a computable homomorphism φ:     →      and Type  3 pairing   or asymmetric pairing;               
there is no computable homomorphism. Type 1 pairing have been proved to have negligible security [3]. Miller 
constructed a framework for the efficient calculation of the Weil pairings and Tate pairing on supersingular 
curve where the embedding degree can either be 1,2,3,4 [4]. Reference [5] followed it up with an algorithm to 
calculate eta-t(ηT ) pairing on supersingular abelian varieties. There have been other efforts to make pairing 
computation as efficient as possible [6,7]. This efforts are not comparable to the efficient computation of scalar 
multiplication on elliptic curve which is employed in elliptic curve cryptography. This lays credence to high 
computation time of the pairing computation which makes pairing cryptography not suitable for wireless sensor 
network because of its constrained energy requirements. Also pairing require huge memory requirements due to 
size of the Elliptic curve cryptography library. Efficient software library have been constructed to solve  the  
problem  [8].  Also  due to resurgence of quantum computers which can solve hard problems in polynomial time 
there is need to construct public key cryptographic primitives with post quantum cryptographic techniques like 
Lattices, Multivariate quadratic equations and Quasi-cyclic Low-Density Parity-check codes. 
3. Related Works 
An identity based encryption scheme was combined with identity based signature scheme with the same public 
and private key parameters. The signature scheme would be used for verification in the  smart  collector.  The 
hardness  of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem 
was assumed. They also employed the Type-A curves used in PBC. Due to pairing computation they discovered 
that their computation cost is a little bit larger than standard during the verification process by the collector [9]. 
The security implications of insider attack, impersonation attack, session key attack and correctness of the 
analysis using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Application were analyzed. They 
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employed bilinear pairing with small parameters for end to end encryption  based on the hardness of Decisional 
Strong Diffie-Hellman  assumption and reported that their scheme was secure against Chosen ciphertext and 
identity attack. They also assumed that the Public Key Generator should be trusted which is not always the case. 
Hash function computation costs was also assumed to be negligible. From the result of their performance 
analysis for n number  of  users  ,  g  number  of  groups  and  e  users in each group the source device  
computes            TE exponentiation operations. There was no pairing operation carried out in the 
encryption phase. For the Decryption phased one modular inversion, one exponential operation, one pairing 
operation and one hash function [10]. An identity based remote data integrity checking with perfect data privacy 
preserving for cloud storage with the clause that an external body with the knowledge of cloud user’s identity 
can verify the authenticity of the data was proposed. Zero knowledge method for data confidentiality analysis 
against the external body was proposed. They employed the notion of asymmetric group key agreement between 
the third party and the cloud server in their protocol construction. Their security analysis was done using the 
generic group model. The computation cost of the Key Generating Centre is 2EG1 + 1H(two exponential 
operation in the cyclic group 1 and one hash operation). Generating tags for file blocks added to the 
computational overhead.  For n blocks the cost is (2n + 1)E 1 + nH. They also stated that the third party verifier 
carries out 1 pairing operation and 6 exponentiation in the cyclic group  1 to challenge queries. This is 
equivalent to (c + 1)E 1 + cP + cH + (c 1)E  2.  For the cloud server generating a proof, the computation cost is 
2P + (2c–1)M 1 + E 2 + M 2. They also employed a pseudo random function and a pseudo-random 
permutation to reduce the communication cost [11]. An identity-based public multi-replica provable data 
possession scheme was proposed to verify data through a third party without Public key certificate. The 
soundness and privacy preservation of the security model was analyzed using formal proof. In their analysis, 
pseudo random functions and arithmetic operation in the finite multiplicative group Zq
∗  was not considered. It 
was reported that the GenProof phase which had a computation cost equivalent to 1Ce+(n+2)Cexp+nCmul were 
n is the challenge block number. The communication cost was reported to be 1G2 + IGT + 3log2q + 1Int for the 
challenge phase and IG2 + 1Hash + 1Sig for the GenProof phase [12]. A revocable identity-based signature 
scheme with cloud revocation server was proposed and the existentially unforgeability against chosen message 
and identity attacks security model was analyzed using the random oracle model. They assumed that an 
untrusted cloud server cannot forge a valid signature even if compromised. They also assumed the hardness of 
the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The order of the groups was set at 512 bits for the cyclic groups 
while 160 bits for the finite group. They also the computation costs of hash operation to be negligible. The 
communication costs is equivalent to [G] + [G] + [G] + [q] were [G] is the order size where G is an elliptic 
curve on finite field Fp [13]. An identity-based signcryption scheme with concealing method for privacy 
enhancement and data integrity    in smart grid communication was proposed. They stated that using minimum 
spanning trees can lead to efficient communication. The computation costs was equivalent to 4Tpmul+1Te for 
the signcryption phase and 1Tpmul + 4Te in the unsigncryption phase. Their communication cost was 
equivalent to m + 2[G] [14].  An identity based encryption scheme with equality test in a smart grid 
environment was proposed. The scheme was proved secured against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity 
attack under the random oracle model. They also employed a trapdoor function to carry out equality technique 
which cannot differentiate the plaintexts if the ciphertexts were given in order to enhance privacy. They assumed 
the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem as their security emphasis. The random prime 
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number length was set at 512- bit while the order was 160-bit. The computation cost was equivalent to 
2Exp + 5M + 2PA + H + h for the encryption phase, 2BP + 2M + PA + H + h for the decryption phase and 2BP + 
2Exp + 2H for the Equality Test phase. The communication cost was equivalent to 2[G1]+2[G1]+2[Zq]+[G1][15]. 
An identity based linearly homomorphic signature scheme employing bilinear groups was proposed. They used 
the random oracle model to analyse their system against existential forgery on chosen message and identity 
attack. They assumed the hardness of Computational Diffie-Hellman problem as the basis of the security of 
their scheme [16]. 
4. Bilinearity 
Assuming    is an additive cyclic group generated by a primitive element    and     is an additive cyclic group 
generated by a primitive element   .    and     has a large  prime order of   . Let    be a multiplicative cyclic 
order group with a large order prime. A computable bilinear map is defined thus eˆ :     ×    →    with the 
following properties 
 Bilinear: For all random integers a, b ∈R Zp∗  and    ∈   ,    ∈    then  eˆ(a  , b  ) = eˆ(  ,   )
ab
 = 
eˆ(  
 ,   
 ) holds(symmetric property) 
 Non-degenerate: All pairs in the additive cyclic group (   ×   ) are not mapped to the identity element 
in    that is eˆ(gp, gq) ≠1Gm   for eˆ(gp, gq) ∈ (G1 × G2) and 1Gm   is an identity element. 
 Computability: ∃ an algorithm to compute in a probabilistic time eˆ(  ,   ) for all   ,    ∈   ,     
Definition 1. Bilinear group generation probabilistic polynomial time algorithm G on input of a security 
paramter 1
α
 output the (G1, G2, Gm, eˆ). 
5. Security Assumption 
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption: For some  random  integers  a, b  ∈  Z∗p   and  given      a  primitive 
element of G1, given the elements (gp, g
a
, g
b
) ∈ G1 compute g
ab
 in probabilistic polynomial time t is very 
infeasible. Bilinear Diffie Hellman Assumption: For some random integers a, b, c  ∈   Z∗p  and given    a 
primitiive element of 1, given the elements (  ,   
 ,   
 ,   
 ) ∈ 1 compute   
    in probabilistic polynomial time   
is very infeasible 
Definition 2 (Negligible function). A function E(α) is called negligible if for every v ≥ 0, ∃ a α0   such that E(α) 
  
 
    holds for every y ≥ y0. 
Definition 3. A protocol is unforgeable against adaptive chosen plaintext message attack if for any 
probabilistic polynomial time adversary   the advantage of winning a game corresponding to a set of identities 
S∗ is with negligible probability in the security parameter α 
Definition 4. The protocol is (T, E(α), qs, qkg, qe, qd) secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) if no PPT 
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adversary making at most qs setup queries,qkg key generation queries,qe encryption queries,qd decryption queries 
can win the game with the advantage Adv
CCA
 =| Pr | d
’
 = d | − 
 
 
 |≥ E(α) 
Definition 5. The protocol is (T, E(α), qs, qkg, qe, qd) secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) if no PPT 
adversary making at most qs setup queries,qkg key generation queries,qe encryption queries,qd decryption queries 
can win the game with the advantage Adv
CP
 
A
 =| Pr | d
i 
= d | − 
 
 
 |≥E(α) 
6. Security Model 
The advantage of the attacker in a sensor network over a legitimate challenger in the sensor network is 
negligible in the following game. The adversary A chooses a set S∗ were | S∗ | ≤ N  and sends S∗ to challenger C. 
The adversary A makes some adaptive queries while the challenger C responds. Setup   Query:  The challenger 
  runs the setup and generates (pparams,mpk,msk) were pparams  is the system parameters, mpk is the master 
public key and msk is the master secret key then forwards params and mpk to adversary   while it keeps the 
confidential the master secret  key msk. First Phase Queries: The adversary makes adaptive KeyGen, sign, 
encrypt, and decrypt queries to challenger in polynomial times as follows KeyGen queries: A queries secret key 
of Identity ID ∈ 0, 1∗, the challenger C responds by running the KeyGen algorithm
SKID and forwards it to the adversary 
Hash queries: A queries hash function on message M adaptively in polynomial times and C responds with hashed 
message to adversary and A stores it in hash list L
Hi
. 
Sign Queries: A makes adaptive queries for a signature on the message M with ID ∈ 0,1. The challenger C runs 
the sign algorithm with pparam, M, SKID and generate signature σ and forwards it to A. 
Encrypt queries: C runs the Encrypt algorithm with input pparams, ID, M to generate the ciphertext CT and 
forwards  to A. Decrypt queries: M runs the Decrypt algorithm with pparams, SKID and CT to generate the 
message M and forwards to A. 
Challenge: A finally outputs ID∗, M0, M1,name∗ to be challenged. Let M0 and M1 be two equal length  plaintext 
messages | M0 | = | M1 |, C responds by choosing a positive integer c in 0,1 and running the Encrypt algorithm 
to generate the challenge ciphertext CT 
∗ 
on identity ID and message M and forwards to A. 
Output: A returns a guess d
i 
and if d
i 
= d then wins the game. 
7. System Model 
The Base Station generates the master public key of the system through the sensor nodes unique identities which 
is their Medium Access Control addresses and the master secret key. It also uses the master secret key to compute 
the private secret key. It sends the master public key to all wireless nodes in the network through a secured 
with input ppparams, mpk, msk, ID to output the secret key 
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channel and keeps the master secret key. The nodes are energy constrained devices that communicate with the 
Base Station. It receives the secret key from the base station which it employs to encrypt data before sending and 
decrypt data on receipt. 
8. Construction 
Setup: The Base station receives an input stimulus in the form of a security parameter α to generate the bilinear 
public parameters pparams. Let    and      be two cyclic groups  and       is  a  cyclic  multiplicative  group  
and  eˆ :      x        →    m is a bilinear map.       and       have the same order of a large prime   with     
 
  . 
The Base station chooses a random number x   ∈     p
∗  and computes gx as the master secret key  and  also  
compute  pparam  =  eˆ(  
x
,  
x
).  Also let   
x
  and   
x
 be the primitive element of the two cyclic additive groups 
respectively. The Base station also chooses cryptographic hash functions;  h1  :{0, 1}∗,  h2  : {0, 1}∗  p
∗,h3  : {0, 1}
n  
→ m,  h4 :   m → {0,1} . The public parameters pparams = (p,gp, gq ,    1,  2,eˆ, pparam, n, h1, h2, h3, h4)  is  
distributed  to all the nodes in the network. 
KeyGen: The node sends its ID to the Base station which employs  the  KeyGen  algorithm  with  input  identity  
ID ∈ {0, 1}n  for some n, the public parameters pparams and the master  secret  key  gx then  chooses  a  
random  integer  r  ∈ Zp∗    and computes SKIDi = (g
x
(µo  
 
  
µi)
r
, g
r
) were SKIDi = (SKIDi,1,  SKIDi,2). 
Encrypt: The node employs the encrypt algorithm with pparams,  ID  and  M as  input  and  chooses  a  random  
number s ∈ Zp∗  to generate ciphertext CT i,1 = Meˆ(g
x
, h(ID)
s
), CT i,2  =  g
s
  and  CT i,3  =  (µo o  
 µi)
r
g
h(ID)
)  were  CT 
=  (CT i,1, CT i,2, CT i,3)  
Decrypt: The receiving node employs the decrypt algorithm with   pparams,, SKIDi  and    as input to generate 
the plaintext message M = CTi,1    eˆ(SKIDi,1, CT i,3    eˆ(SKIDi,2, CT i,2) 
9. Conclusion 
In this letter, we presented a basic encryption scheme with a better computational savings as compared to some 
reviewed scheme in literature. In the future we will analyze the correctness of our construction                                                                                                                 
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